Since the 1970s, medical technologies have changed the reproductive body and our relationship to it, in particular altering the process of reproductive decision making. With assisted reproductive technology (whose acronym, ironically, is ART), it is possible for a child to have at least two biological mothers.6 Through the use of assisted reproductive technology, biological motherhood has been separated into competing components of genetics and gestation, a separation that has given rise to disputes over motherhood and its meanings. As a growing number of couples elect to hire gestational mothers to have their children, more and more people are finding themselves involved in legal battles over what used to be considered the definitive "fact" of maternal identity.7 In Johnson v. Calvert the parties disputed this very question. Both sides wanted the courts to decide whether the "natural" mother of the baby was Anna Johnson, the woman who carried the child in her womb and gave birth to it, or Crispina Calvert, the woman who, though unable to give birth, intended for the child to be born, supplied the ova, and made the necessary arrangements for the child to be (re)produced. 
In this essay I argue that what happened in Johnson v. Calvert is symptomatic of a general crisis in
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Deborah R. Grayson Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law sionals; surrogates; donors; and, increasingly, the state. Now not only is birth a process mediated by the intervention of physicians but the process of conception has become a more complex, drastically mediated process as well. The "private act of love, intimacy, and secrecy" of creating a child, as Sarah Franklin argues, has become a "public act, a commercial transaction, and a professionally managed procedure."8 Nevertheless, despite the increasingly public and collaborative process of procreation, the courts in Johnson v. Calvert and other such cases have attempted to maintain the priority of the metanotion of a private, genetic family.
Section 2 addresses the complicated and never fully articulated relations among gender, economics, and race and the ways they get expressed in the family form. I delineate the euphemized quality of repro-discourse that enables the family form to take such discursive priority that race, gender, and class hierarchies are ignored. Although these hierarchies are central, their stories aren't being told at all because the family is perceived as an interlocked unit-an intimate, guarded entity that serves as a standin for the issues that don't get worked out. Facilitating the lack of resolution of matters of family in Johnson v. Calvert is the iconicity of Johnson's pregnant black body as a signifier for a set of sublimated meanings about family and race. Johnson's body is at once too much body-a body that is laden with multiple meanings-and too little body-a body that is reduced to meaning very little at all. She enters the public discourse, as Valerie Hartouni notes, as a "densely scripted figure" that is "occupying and occupied by the category 'black woman."'9 Indeed, during and after the various trials, Johnson was depicted as everything from a welfare queen and con artist to an extortionist. Her body is, then, both a site of explanation and a body that creates, in a new way, a problem of meaning.
Predictably, Anna Johnson's body is the only body that is explicitly raced in what is presented as merely a story of two mothers. The racial identity of Crispina Calvert, a Filipina American and the other mother of 8. Sarah Franklin, "Postmodern Procreation: A Cultural Account of Assisted Reproduction," in Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction, ed. Faye D. Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (Berkeley, 1995), p. 336. See also part 1 of a four-part series on infertility published in the New York Times. This article on high-tech pregnancies and the fertility market focuses on clinics and hospitals with specialties in in vitro fertilizations (IVF). This branch of medicine is reported to be part of a "virtually free-market branch of medicine" that is a "$350 million-a-year business." The article describes mostly affluent couples paying upwards of $25,000 or more for procedures, usually IVF, to assist them in conception. Very few insurance companies cover IVF, making most of the financial burden fall on the couples themselves. Prices for the procedure described in the article include a $2,000 to $3,000 fee for egg donors for those women who are unable to produce their own eggs to a median cost of $7,800 for one procedure of IVF that lasts about the length of a menstrual cycle. Since most couples are not successful on the first try, many couples end up trying three to four more times before giving up. Winter 1998 529 baby Christopher, is never acknowledged. In the eyes of the court and in the public debate surrounding the case, she becomes white.10 Mark Calvert, the white father, is not negatively defined by race. The signs of race, specifically the signs of black race, operate as an often silent but nevertheless powerful narrative motive within the trial and in its surrounding publicity. Race, specifically black race, is pre-scripted in this case by existing narratives in current and historical memory in the United States that define mothers and motherhood as bearers of social, cultural, and racial identity."I Motherhood, in Johnson v. Calvert, is a tightly policed border where racial, class, and sexual hierarchies are defined and maintained in the name of familial affiliation.
Finally, in section 3 I suggest ways to move beyond the limited definitions of who and what is a mother. At issue is the question of whether or not the national public can imagine a public family. What does family stand for in American culture? More specifically, how does surrogacy raise questions about tacit knowledge of race and familial kinship? I argue that more diverse definitions of mother and, by extension, of father and of family are both possible and necessary to accommodate the different methods used to (re)produce and introduce babies into families. Drawing on Patricia Hill Collins's concept of shifting centers in her analysis of motherhood and reproduction, I argue that practices of assisted conception such as surrogacy require that we find ways to acknowledge rather than diminish or ignore the participation of all parents in these processes even if the effect is to destabilize previously held notions of the family. 
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Winter 1998 531 her attorneys claimed that a legal precedent had been set that established her right to be a mother to the child she carried even though she was not genetically related to it.16 Section 7003 of the act states that "the parent and child relationship may be established . . . between a child and a natural mother.... by proof of her having given birth to the child."17 While providing drastically different reasons for their findings, the rulings given by the trial court, the appellate court, and the California Supreme Court majority denied Johnson's claim that she was the natural mother of the baby. Rejecting Johnson's interpretation of the California Uniform Parentage Act, Judge Parslow, the presiding judge in the trial court, held that the statute does not say that a woman who gives birth to a child is its natural mother. According to him, the act merely states that, in addition to blood testing, one way to establish a parent-child relationship is by giving birth. Characterizing Johnson as a foster mother and a wet nurse rather than as a natural mother, Judge Parslow unequivocally stated that he was not going to find that the infant had two mothers-a situation he described as "ripe for crazy-making. that genes were incontestable evidence of parentage. Providing a more detailed analysis of the Uniform Parentage Act in their ruling, the appellate court argued that its specialized provision authorizing biological evidence such as blood as proof of parentage allowed them to conclude that the genetic relationship was conclusively more persuasive than the gestational relationship. As Randy Frances Kandel demonstrates, when viewed in this way, disputes arising from surrogate arrangements will always inevitably favor the genetic mother as natural parent over the gestational mother. By focusing solely on biological markers such as blood to determine parentage, Kandel points out, the courts suggest that it is possible that "'natural' parenthood" can be "reduced to a single simple biological principle" ("WC," p. 176).
Kandel, as well as others, points to the kind of reasoning both the trial court and the appellate court used in their rulings on Johnson v. Calvert as examples of genetic essentialism, a mode that has been described by Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee as "a way to talk about the boundaries of personhood, the nature of immortality, and the sacred meaning of life."20 According to Nelkin and Lindee, genetic essentialism "promises to resolve uncomfortable ambiguities and uncertainties" brought about by existing boundaries of class, race, gender, and, I would add, family.21 Increasingly, the courts are using biological concepts to settle custody disputes involving infants born to gestational mothers, controversies over adoptions, and situations where babies have been switched at birth.22 Whereas previously the "best interests of the child" theory was used in child custody suits, genetic evidence is now more often favored by the courts.23
In 
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Deborah R. Grayson tional mothers have substantial claims to legal motherhood. And yet, as she points out, California law bestows the "rights and responsibilities of parenthood to only one 'natural mother,"' with no provision for what to do when a situation indicates that a child has more than one. The "originator of the concept" or rule of intent argument, an argument Kennard describes as comfortingly familiar to the courts in instances where they are called to justify the law's protection of intellectual property, is, in her view, wrong for determining parenthood and parental rights because it suggests that children and the right to children can be viewed as property comparable to a book, a software program, or any other invention. In addition, she argued, using the rule of intent to "break the tie" between the genetic and gestational mother of the child also suggests that "property transactions governed by contracts . . . ought presumptively to be enforced and, when one party seeks to escape performance, the court may order specific performance."32
In addition to the objections Justice Kennard outlines in her dissenting arguments, the rule of intent raises several other issues that need to be considered. What about Johnson's parental intentions as gestational mother? One could argue that, like the Calverts, she also intended to procreate, demonstrating this intention when she allowed herself to be implanted with the Calverts' zygote, carried it to full development at some risk to herself, and then changed her mind about relinquishing the baby once she had delivered it.33 The courts, as I have mentioned, felt that Johnson should have had no expectation that she would be able to keep and raise the child. After all that Johnson had invested in the pregnancy, the courts decided somehow that her desire to be a mother to the child was "unnatural." And, while the Calverts obviously wanted Christopher and fought long and hard to keep him, there have been instances when genetic parents have reneged on contractual agreements with gestational mothers and refused to take their intended child once it had been delivered.34 Finally, the rule of intent, as Anita Allen persuasively 33. Johnson had had a history of problem pregnancies-two miscarriages and two stillbirths before and after her own daughter was born-a fact she failed to reveal to the Calverts when she entered into the agreement with them. Furthermore, some have argued that because the fetus and the gestational mother are unrelated, the gestational mother is at higher risk for severe complications during pregnancy such as ectopic pregnancy, preeclampsia, and diabetes. On this point, see "WC," p. 189.
34. In one situation a gestational mother gave birth to twins, a boy and a girl. 36. While scientists are currently able to construct artificial wombs, so far they have only managed it for animals, not humans. Scientists in Japan have developed a technique called extrauterine fetal incubation (EUFI). Using goat fetuses, the scientists have "threaded catheters through the large vessels in the umbilical cord and supplied the fetuses with oxygenated blood while suspending them in incubators that contain artificial amniotic fluid heated to body temperature." The goat fetuses were able to survive in this environment for three weeks, although team physicians had difficulty with circulatory failure in the experiments, as well as encountering other technological problems. While scientists are quoted as saying that the "ideal situation for the immature fetus is growth within the normal environment of the maternal organisms," they continue to pursue the technology for constructing artificial wombs for humans. Arthur Caplan, the director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania predicts that "sixty years down the line . ., the total artificial womb will be here," arguing that this procedure is "technologically inevitable" Ironically, in the discourse surrounding the case, Johnson is the only person who is described as having a problem with race. Attorneys for the Calverts painted her as so captivated by whiteness that she wanted to have a white baby (see "BB," pp. 83-84). Johnson, of course, does have a problem with race, but it is not a problem of fetishizing whiteness. Instead, her problem has to do with the fact that as a black woman she is defined by and is thought to embody race. But what does race mean here? Hartouni describes Johnson as "enter[ing] the public discourse an already densely scripted figure whose deviance, whatever its particular form, was etched in flesh" ("BB," p. 75). Indeed, the portrayal ofJohnson in the courts and in the media as a fraudulent welfare mother, con artist, and extortionist plays on beliefs long held by the public that black women are "less fit mothers, less caring mothers, and less hurt by separation from their children" than nonblack women.40
In representing Johnson as a welfare cheat, the media and the Calverts' attorneys employed a form of shorthand not only for her blackness but also for the kind of person, and particularly the kind of mother, she would be. The unsubstantiated charges that Johnson had defrauded the government by receiving welfare payments she was not entitled to made it easier for some to make the point that she was untrustworthy, dishonest, and therefore an unfit parent. By identifying Johnson as a welfare recipient, a point that was repeatedly mentioned in press coverage throughout the trial, no one had to make explicit the racial grounds for their objections to considering Johnson a mother, in any sense, to Christopher. The welfare mother, as Wahneema Lubiano notes, "can be seen as exemplifying the pathology of the category 'black women.'"41 The representation of "black woman" and "welfare mother" as the same that constructs evidence of the pathological nature of both operates in Johnson v. Calvert as a narrative means to shape public opinion regarding the intersection of race, motherhood, and surrogacy. Race, in Johnson v. Calvert, signifies not only blackness but blackness as difference and deviance. Undergoing what is now referred to as "traditional surrogacy," Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Stern's sperm. Whitehead was denied custody, but she was granted visitation rights based on her genetic tie with the child. Still, the possibility remains that a surrogate mother under these circumstances would be granted full custody as well.
50. Ironically, while black women have an infertility rate that is one-and-a-half times higher than white women, they are the least likely to benefit from assisted reproductive technology or other infertility "treatments." Cost tends to be a prohibitive factor in many instances. Rather than being supported in their desire to reproduce, black women's attempts at reproduction are most often perceived as dangerous, something that should be controlled. But, as I will demonstrate in the next section, another reason why black women make up a small percentage of the women who utilize assisted reproductive technology could also be their reliance on alternative models of mothering. In these models, as I will discuss, genetic relation is not considered imperative to establishing kinship ties.
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Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law spond to these questions by proposing the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA), a piece of legislation that addressed most of the issues involved in Johnson v. Calvert. The legislation was never enacted. The failure to do so, I suspect, has a lot to do with the reluctance of the legislature to go on record as taking a position on an issue that is considered to present such complex moral problems. As bioethicist James Nelson has said, politicians "run the other way" when legislation on surrogacy comes before them because, on one hand, to make surrogate contracts unenforceable would be to limit the options of infertile couples attempting to have children and, on the other hand, to support surrogacy would mean that they might be seen as facilitating the "exploitation of women [and the cheapening] of the family."51 What was once described as the "biologically rooted, racially closed, heterosexual, middle-class" family has been disrupted by the new knowledge that assisted reproductive technology has made available ("BB," p. 87). With assisted conception, as Strathern notes, there increasingly "exists a field of procreators whose relationship to one another and to the product of conception is contained in the act of conception itself and not in the family as such" ("DK," p. 352). In a discussion of the manner in which reproductive technologies are "displacing knowledge" about familial kinship, Strathern argues that "making visible the detachment of the procreative act from the way the family produces a child adds new possibilities to the conceptualization of intimacy in relationships" ("DK," p. 353). In so doing, these technologies displace our sense of what we have come to know about health, life, and death. Still, the legal system has been slow to address how this expansion in knowledge and the resulting proliferation of meanings put people in the position of having to make new choices-to make different kinds of decisions based on this transformed information (see "DK," p. 347).
The belief held by the courts in Johnson v. Calvert that a child may have only one mother is inconsistent both with the new facts of life that technology has made possible and with some of the courts' own models for reconfiguring the family in light of this technology. In fact, models of family that are different from the nuclear family model were already available for the courts to choose from. These existing models would have allowed the courts to acknowledge the parental rights of the Calverts and Johnson without diminishing the role of either. Courts have acknowledged the division of procreative mothering from social mothering in decisions on adoption and stepparenting, for example. In both instances maternal status is extended to at least one other woman. In addition, in In Johnson v. Calvert the California Supreme Court did acknowledge that there was undisputed evidence that both women could be mothers to baby Christopher. But the court then went to great lengths to describe why both could not be considered mothers to the child and why Crispina Calvert, rather than Anna Johnson, must be considered the natural mother. The model of motherhood that Collins describes is one that is "communal and extended rather than individualized and privatized."55 In this particular model of motherhood, the weight of biological or genetic ties and their significance for defining familial relationships is
